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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH

NANCY JANE PEART ROCHE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
MELVIN KENT ROCHE,
Case No. 15806
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from a denial of a Motion to Amend
the Decree of Divorce which motion was made two years after
the Decree was granted.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant-Appellant's Motion to Amend the Decree of
Divorce was denied with prejudice in the First Judicial
District Court of Box Elder County by the Honorable VeNoy
Christoffersen, Judge.

The Motion to Amend s::>ught to relieve

Defendant-Appellant of child support payments ordered by the
Decree granted April 9, 1975; the Motion to Amend was dated
September 24, 1977.

The Court ruled that the proper procedure
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to consider new evidence at such late d3te after the Decree
had been granted was to bring a new action rather than to

fi~

a Motion to vacate the Decree as to paternity.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant states in his brief to this court the
relief he seeks on appeal.

He asks for a reversal of the lower

court's denial of his motion to amend the Decree of Divorce,
which motion he based on Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, Rule

60(b}, and an application for a writ of Coram Nobis.

The

proper relief to seek from this court is a ruling that the
lower court abused its discretion or acted contrary to law
in requiring Appellant-Defendant to bring his request for
partial relief by reasons of an independent action rather than
by means of a Motion in the original action.

Such relief

sought on appeal would be directly responsive to the trial
court's ruling.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Respondent,

re reinafter

referred to as the

Respondent, adopts the facts substantially in the form as
set out in Defendant-Appellant's brief, hereinafter referred to
as Appellant, in as far as the facts are revealed, but Appellant
fails to outline the facts concerning procedural actions which
were taken and thus confuses the issue which is now before
this court.

The additional necessary facts'follow.

The Decree of Divorce was granted April 9, 1975 (R-33)
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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between Appellant and Respondent with provisions for child
support and rights of visitation.

on April 4, 1977, Appellant

made a motion in the lower court to vacate the Decree of
Divorce as to paternity and to obtain relief from child support
payments upon the discovery of new evidence which showed that
he was not the biological father of the child (R-66).

Appellant

attached an application for a Writ of Coram Nobis to this
motion, though he did not file, pay filing fees, nor meet the statutory requirements for issuance and service of process involved
with an independent action.
The court, in a Memorandum Decision dated February 17, 1978,
ruled against Appellant's Motion upon the finding that the case
was directly controlled by McGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 2d 200,
494 P.2d 283
949 (1959),

(1972)
(R-99).

and Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 222, 341 P.2d
Appellant argued in his Motion for Recon-

sideration dated January 30, 1978, that upon the theory of the
Writ of Coram Nobis and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
60(b), the court should have granted his motion and that the
recent case of Egan v. Egan, 560 P.2d 704 (1977), mandates
the granting of his motion

(R-102).

The trial court, in a

Memorandum Decision dated March 16, 1978, ruled against
such Motion to Reconsider (R-114).
The additional facts are necessary to clarify that the reason
"the Court denied the setting aside of the order of payment
of child support"

(last paragraph of Appellant's brief, p. 5)

is that the court found upon the rulings of Shaw, McGavin
and~,

supra, that the prq:Er method of obtaining partial
-3-
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relief from the Divorce Decree is to bring an independent
action; a Motion to Amend the original Divorce Decree is
inadequate.

The record discloses that from beginning to end

all documents filed are filed in Civil No. 12730.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
GRANT THE MOTION TO AMEND THE DIVORCE DECREE
AND THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT A NEW,
INDEPENDENT ACTION WAS THE PROPER AVENUE
FOR OBTAINING RELIEF.
A.

Appellant's Motion did not meet the requirements of

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b) because the Motion
for Amendment came more than three months after Judgment had
been entered.
Rule 60(b) endows the trial court witn considerable
authority to ensure justice by allowing the trial court to
grant a motion to obtain relief from a Judgment if the motion
is based upon certain theories and if the motion is timely.
The facts of the case here may fall within one or more of
three possible theories which could be the basis for Appellant's
motion for relief:
fraud.

Mistake, newly discovered evidence, or

Other theories upon which a motion for relief can be

grounded are

lis~ed

and in his pleadings, appellant does

assert that his case falls within the catch-all of reason (7) •
"any other reason justifying relief" •

Despite that assertion,

he clearly argues and attempts to prove his cause on the
basis of either mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud,
-4-
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but those three theories all require that a Motion for relief
must be brought within three months of the entry of Judgment;
Appellant's Motion to Amend the Divorce Decree was brought
two years after the Decree of Divorce had been entered.
(Appellant's cause does not qualify for a Rule 60(b) motion
for relief, by a reading of the language of the Rule.)
The Rule clarifies that it does not limit the power of
a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a pnrty
from a Judgment.

Appellant's Argument, Point I, confuses the

issues and argues that the trial court erred in not makjrg a
finding of fact that the child was not his.

The court does

specifically recognize that fact, but, in following the mandate
of Rule 60(b), it holds that relief from the Decree of Divorce
should come by way of a separate action and not as a Rule 60(b),
(1),

(2), or (3) motion.
B.

The Trial court did not misconstrue case law as :i1:

has developed in Shaw v. Pilcher, McGavin v. McGavin and Egan v.
Egan, which cases required the trial court to hold as it did.
Appellant relies heavily upon Egan v. Egan, supra.

He

argues that it controls this matter and displaces Shaw v. Pilcher,
supra, and McGavin v. McGavin, supra, as controlling authority.
In Shaw v. Pilcher, an ex-husband consented to the adoption of
the child of his marriage by his ex-wife and her new husband.
When the ex-husband found that the character of the new husband
was questionable, he moved the court to grant relief in the
original adoption matter

by setting aside the adoption decree,

alleging that the new husband and ex-wife had defrauded the
-5 -
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court.

This was seventeen months after the adoption decree

was entered.

The new husband argued that the proceeding

for relief was in violation of Rule 60{b) because it fell
outside the three month limitation period.

This court then

ruled at 950:
A reading of the rule makes it apparent that a
motion for relief based on the grounds enumerated
therein is ineffective if made three months after the
decision from which relief is sought. The proceeding
here, although captioned a "Petition", was in fact
a motion made in the original action, and was based
primarily on an allegation of "fraud upon the court".
we believe and hold that where "fraud upon the court"
is the gravamen of the proceeding, such proceeding must
be pursued in an independent action by filing a separate
suit, paying the statutory filing fee therefore, {which
was not done here) and requiring the statutory issuance
and service of process.
The attack here being based upon fraud upon the court,
and having been leveled some seventeen months after
the adoption decree, must have been pursued in an
independent action, arrl not by way of motion in the
original action.
Otherwise, the rule would not make
sense.
The Shaw v. Pilcher reasoning was foun:l
control in McGavin v. McGavin, a 1972 case.

to directly
There, upon

facts substantially similar to those of the instant ca:;e
the court ruled at 283 that the motion to set aside the
divorce decree relating to custody of and support money for
a child which was allegedly not the issue of the marriage,
was improper because the motion was made 14 1/2 months after
the divorce decree.
such procedure did not comply with Rule 60{b),
utah Rules of Civil Procedure, vo. 9, p. 662, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953. The instant case is governed by the
provisions of that rule as interpreted in the case of
shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 222, 341 P. 2d 949 (1959)
which is dispositive here.
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Appellant's reliance upon Egan v. Egan is misplaced
because Egan did not overrule or weaken Shaw or McGavin.
rn reality, Egan strengthens the Shaw and McGavin line of
reasoning.

Egan holds on facts strikingly similar to the

instant case that under Rule 60(b), the trial court may exercise
its discretion to grant the relief necessary to do justice even
though the action comes later than three months after the Decree
is entered, if relief is sought by way of an independent action.
The Supreme

Cour~

in reaching this decision through the same

trial judge who ruled in the instant case, strengthens the
discretion cf the trial court to grant that relief which is necessary to do Justice.

Egan does not overrule Shaw and McGavin, but

rather fills out case law interpretation of the meaning of Rule
Shaw & McGavin hold that relief under Rule 60(b) may

60(b).

come from a motion made as part of the same proceedings if
brought within three months of the entering of the Judgment.
Egan illuminates another aspect of the rule:
60(b)

Nothing in Rule

limits the rights of parties to obtain relief in an

independent action brought outside the three-month limitation
period.
The case law required the trial court to disallow a motion
brought as part of the same proceeding and not as a separate
action when the motion came two years after the entry of Judgment.
C.

Appellant's Request for a writ of Coram Nobis was

correctly refused, it being in fact a motion in the original
action and not an independent action.
Although there is some authority that a common-law Writ
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of Coram Nobis may be considered to be in the nature of a new
action,

18 Am.Jur2d, §31, Coram Nobis, the conduct of the

Appellant in his pleadings and argument before the court
rightly demonstrated to the trial court that the gravamen
of the action was a motion made upon the mistake theory of
Rule 60 (b) (1), the newly discovered evidence theory of Rule
60(b) (2), or upon the fraud or misrepresentation theory of
Rule 60 (b) (3), and not upon the Rule 60 (b) (7) catch-all
provision.
This conclusion is reasonable in light of the facts.
Appellant's request for a writ of Coram Nobis first appeared
on April 4, 1977 as an attachment to a motion in the original
action which motion was to partially vacate the Decree of
Divorce; and even though Appellant attempted to style his
motion as an application for a Writ of

Coram Nobis, it was

in truth, a Rule 60(b) motion clothed in another label.

This

is apparent from Appellant's attempts to show by medical
opinions and results of tests that newly discovered evidence
did not justify the Judgment; this approach goes directly to
the mistake and/or newly discovered evidence theories of the
Rule.

In addition, in his affidavit attached to the Motion to

partially vacate the Decree of Divorce, Appellant states in
paragraph 9 that he believes that the ex-wife's representatioos
in the original Decree were false;

this is argument which woo~

support the fraud theory of the Rule.
The court's ruling that the application for the writ
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was simply another motion, serves to preserve the integrity of
the court system and the procedures by which it is governed.
As in Shaw, Appellant here should be prevented from applying
a label to his action in order to meet the requirements of the
law (assuming arguendo that the Writ of Coram Nobis is a new
action in this 'jurisdiction and exempt from the usual requirements
of filing,

fees, notice and service of process) while truly

and as a matter of fact he argues a different theory for which
he does not qualify.

The requirement that Appellant style,

plead and prove the same theory and the requirement that he
must qualify under that theory are not mere technicalities;
the requirements should be imposed to protect the integrity
of the judicial system and provide regularity and stability
upon which all may depend.

This strong policy of the law is

stated in Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662,
(1966).

Though the facts of that case are not similar to the

instant dispute, it was decided upon the same policy as should
control in all contests of procedure.
Even though the new rules of procedure had as a
part of their purposes the removing of undue
technicalities and rigidities in the law, and
are to be liberally construed to effectuate
justice, nevertheless, they were designed to
provide a pattern of regularity of procedure
which the parties and the courts could follow and
rely upon.
(Drury v. Lunceford, supra, at 663.)
The trial court has ruled that Appellant may not obtain
relief through an improper method and that he must make that
attempt for relief by properly filing a new, independent action.
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Such a requirement is uniformly imposed upon all WJ.o wish to
avail themselves of the protection of the courts.
CONCLUSION
Rule 60 (b) requires that a party seeking to obtain relief
from a Judgment upon the grounds of mistake, newly discovered
evidence, or fraud must file his motion within three months
of the entry of Judgment.

Otherwise, relief must come through

an independent action, which action must meet the usual requiuments of filing and service of process.

The gravamen of

Appellant's request for relief relies upon theories which
require that Appellant bring his motion for relief within the
three-month limitations period.
The trial court found that, though styled as an applicatwn
for a Writ of Coram Nobis, the request for relief was in reality
introduced as a motion to a prior proceeding and not as a
new action, and that Appellant's conduct and efforts at trial
were consistent with that reality.

The Respondent prays that

the trial court's Judgment be upheld and that Appellant be
required to comply with proper rules of procedure.
Respectfully submitted this

_._O'--- day of November,

1978

DALE M. DO
Attorney for Respondent
P. o. Box u
29 south Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
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